provided a means to conduct commerce and wield power throughout history, cyberspace today provides the same to powerful nations with conquering militaries.
The significant difference today is that cyberspace provides those opportunities not only to powerful nations, but also to lone actors whose individual actions can have strategic affect given the speed with which communications and actions are transmitted on the digital infrastructure. The U.S. needs a strong defense in cyberspace against those who wish it harm, as well as a strong offense supported by international laws governing the use of cyberspace operations. This paper addresses both the opportunities and challenges posed in this new dimension as well as the implications of operating in cyberspace for the U.S. The U.S. must take a leading role in developing laws governing cyberspace operations both as a battlespace and as a place of commerce and communications.
CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS: INFLUENCE UPON EVOLVING WAR THEORY
We meet today at a transformational moment --a moment in history when our interconnected world presents us, at once, with great promise but also great peril. Though the nature of warfare itself has not changed, -conflict is still waged between people over resources, land, pride, and power-the development of the Internet, the incredible access to information it provides, and the speed of communications and commerce facilitated by the digital infrastructure in cyberspace have irreversibly expanded the environment in which warfare and conflict are waged.
The impact of this change in the way world powers, economic entities, and private citizens interact and function cannot be underestimated. As President Obama noted in the epigraph, this new form of interaction is both a blessing, in that it offers incredible flexibility in global communications and commerce, and a curse in that it is extremely vulnerable to exploitation by criminals, foreign adversaries, and adversarial non-state actors who might wish the U.S. and its citizens harm. Understanding cyberspace and adapting war theory to account for cyberspace is an integral component of ensuring the kidnapping to obtain funds. 15 Today's wave of insurgents has similarly adapted, using cyberspace to proliferate their message.
It is important to note that cyberspace, though a battlespace in the broader war waged by terrorists and/or extremists, is neutral ground, not owned or occupied by either side. Just as a terrorist group can use the Internet to spread its anti-government message, governments can and must use the Internet to boost their own legitimacy.
Here we can take valuable advice from Sun Tzu when he asserted, "what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy." 16 If the adversary's strategy relies on gaining popular support and creating conditions in which it can fight an extended war on the ground and in cyberspace, the U.S. and its allies return fire by denying the enemy that popular support. Countering the enemy's strategy early denies him the opportunity to create a situation in which the insurgency has no apparent end.
Cyberspace offers the U.S. two ways in which to counter threat actors. First it proffers the same battlespace in which to counter extremist messages. Second, it
provides an opportunity to "attack" an enemy using what would typically be considered a traditional nation state tool: "commerce prevention" 17 Intelligence Research and Analysis, James Mulvenon, the PRC has a different approach to the execution of cyber warfare that leverages Chinese citizens to volunteer internet hacking skills to support PRC national objectives. 24 Many analysts have pointed out that this practice of using citizens to support broader national objectives is reflective of Mao Tse-tung's concept of mobilizing "the whole people to unite as one man and carry on the war with unflinching perseverance." 25 In order to ensure support of both its people and its allies, the U.S. must retain the moral high ground and avoid the misuse of its national power in cyberspace that could result in increased repression of the same people the U.S. intends to positively influence. 26 Sun Tzu stated, "Those skilled in war cultivate the Tao and preserve the laws and are therefore able to formulate victorious policies." 27 Our current National Security Strategy reflects this principle noting "Our values have allowed us to draw the best and brightest to our shores, to inspire those who share our cause abroad, and to
give us the credibility to stand up to tyranny." 28 The U.S. must take a leadership role in both increasing regulation to limit illicit activity in cyberspace and in using cyberspace to continue to spread its message of democracy and freedom to all people.
Defensive Operations in Cyberspace
If access to cyberspace uniquely characterizes the current strategic environment, defending that access may present the greatest military and governmental challenge in the 21 st Century. President Barack Obama made it clear that securing America's cyber infrastructure is a national security priority by officially declaring the U.S. digital infrastructure as a "strategic national asset" in the May 2010 National Security
Strategy. 29 The Internet, designed to provide rapid exchange of vast amounts of information, was not built for the protection of that information. The lack of network defenses has not been lost on those entities that wish to do U.S. harm and building those defenses has proven to be difficult for nations, citizens, and corporations alike. Readiness Teams (USCERT). 34 The Department is also charged with coordinating the critical infrastructure protection activities of private companies. 35 The newly operational U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) provides oversight of the security of DoD networks. 36 In an effort to improve synchronization of the roles of the DoD and the DHS, the two agencies signed a memorandum of agreement on 10 October 2010 designed to "increase interdepartmental collaboration in strategic planning for the Nation's Cyber security, mutual support for cyber security capabilities development, and synchronization of current operational cyber security mission activities." 37 In the private sector, individual corporations are responsible for providing security for their corporate networks and private citizens provide the same for their personal computers and home networks.
This dispersed approach to providing cybersecurity to the nation's digital infrastructure is proving to be inadequate. The cybersecurity company Symantec reported in August 2010 that 1 in 74.6 emails addressed to government/public was blocked as malicious, making this sector the most targeted industry for malware. 38 The company Mobile Active Defense Partners, LLC estimates that there are more than 100 million computers currently part of criminal networks, 39 many of which are likely personally-owned computers that have been pulled into botnets 40 through viruses unbeknownst to their owners. According to a recent study by cybersecurity provider
McAfee, over one trillion dollars was lost to cybercrime last year both in the form of intellectual property and the costs associated with addressing cyber intrusions. 41 Given statistics like these as a backdrop, it is clear why the U.S. is concerned about its national cyber infrastructure. It is also clear that malicious threats to this infrastructure are not only directed at the federal government, but at corporations, the DoD, and private citizens. Over the last few years, there has been increasing deliberation both in the government and private sector regarding the government's role in regulating the nation's cyber infrastructure.
There are several key concerns regarding the government's involvement in protecting the digital infrastructure. First is the concern that government oversight will result in either a violation of citizens' privacy or a reduction in civil liberties. Cyber blogger and author Jim Harper argues that the U.S. government should not be responsible for providing computer security to private citizens any more so than the government is responsible for securing an individual's home. 42 The flaw in this analogy is that a neighbor's careless home security practices do not result in letting a burglar into another neighbor's living room. Due to its interconnectivity, careless security practices on one part of the network quickly result in intrusions on another; the federal government, corporate America, and the average citizen all share the same digital network.
Those who argue against more government involvement in providing private and public sector cybersecurity are concerned that their privacy may be compromised by government oversight; ironically it is the same privacy the government would like to protect that is being violated by criminal internet activity such as identity theft. Large corporations, however, are beginning to recognize the need for more government involvement in protecting against the loss of intellectual property and money due to cyber crime. In one recent study, Mr. David Batz of the Edison Electric Institute noted that because the government obtains classified actionable intelligence regarding cyber threat activity, there must be closer coordination between government and private/public sector entities. 43 Another concern regarding governmental involvement in providing national cybersecurity is the lack of international laws or norms in cyberspace. As retired Active defensive measures are more effective, but also more controversial.
Active defensive measures are roughly the equivalent of counterstrikes. For example, if an intrusion is detected on a network, active measures might allow the attack or intrusion to be tracked back to its origin and then engaged in some way that affects the attacker's computer system. 46 Aggressive active defensive measures could present a danger on the globally connected network for several reasons. First, it is difficult to control the path of a cyber counterstrike given that many attackers or criminals will use third party Internet service providers, potentially in third countries, to cover the trail their intrusion might leave behind. Second, and perhaps most importantly, international law is very unclear as to the legal restrictions of conducting such activity by individual persons or international companies and governments on the global network. asserted that the defensive form of warfare was the strongest form, but he went on to clarify that defense "has a negative object" and "that it should be used only so long as weakness compels and be abandoned as soon as we are strong enough to pursue the positive object." 53 In its critical role of providing traditional land, air, and sea forces to protect the U.S.' homeland, the DoD does not lack clarity in its approach. Per Joint Publication 3-27 Homeland Defense, the U.S. military may take action to "destroy, degrade, disrupt, or neutralize" threat capabilities "before they are employed by an adversary. 54 It is time for the U.S. to adopt a similar strategy for the execution of war in cyberspace.
One needs look no further than the 2008 Russian attack on Georgia for evidence of the emerging role of cyber attack in the conduct of state-on-state conflict. During a period of high tension between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia, and just prior to
Russian ground forces moving in to the disputed territory, a massive denial of service attack was launched on Georgian web sites. 55 The cyber attack rendered the Georgian government nearly incapable as its file servers were crippled, Georgian web sites defaced, and Georgian banks overwhelmed by denial of service attacks. Though attributing the cyberattacks to the Russian government was not possible at the time, political analysts assess that the Russian government was likely complicit in the attacks based on the sophistication of the attacks. 56 The Georgian National Security Council
Secretary, Eka Tkeshelashvili, referred to the cyber attacks as a Russian attack on a fourth front; the first three fronts being land, sea, and air. 57 One of the primary reasons there is little legal clarity regarding acceptable responses to aggressive cyber intrusions or attacks is the limited ability to trace the source of the activity back to a specific actor in cyberspace. There remain valid concerns that direct cyberspace operations will either hit the wrong target or have unintended consequences elsewhere on the network. Of note, indisputable positive identification of the enemy has never been an absolute imperative in war. Though a moral actor would prefer to be able to identify every target as a specific valid, military target, the fog and friction of war often preclude such certainties. Counter-battery fire provides a good example of this principle. Artillery fire is exchanged between groundbased sites potentially hundreds of miles apart. Units on the ground respond by conducting counter-battery operations directed at an enemy they cannot see. Arguably a cyberattack's path is far more difficult to identify than an artillery trajectory, but as nations work together to create a less lawless and more regulated cyberspace, uncertainty will decrease. It may take one round of fires and counter-fires to generate enough concern within the international community to focus efforts on increasing regulation of the Internet, but the U.S. must assume a leadership role in shaping future international cyberspace operations norms. 62 it is only a matter of time before USCYBERCOM and DHS leadership will have an opportunity to respond to a cyberspace crisis. Stuxnet, the malicious worm some experts believe was designed by a nation-state to sabotage
Iran's nuclear program, 63 presages the likely near-future of cyberspace operations.
Fortunately, Stuxnet, the "cyber shot heard around the world" as one reporter described it, was most likely aimed not at the U.S. but at Iran-this time. 64 What comes after Stuxnet and what that means to the cyberspace capabilities of the U.S. are the questions USCYBERCOM and DHS will need to address.
Conclusion: War for the 21st Century
As this paper demonstrates, the nature of war in the 21 st Century may not change but the strategic environment in which nations fight has changed dramatically due to the expansion of operations in cyberspace. The U.S. can and should prepare for this new environment by assuming a leading role in shaping the international norms in cyberspace. War theorists from Sun Tzu to Corbett provide useful advice that is as appropriate today as it was when it was written for this expanded domain has more similarities to land, sea, and air space than dissimilarities.
The U.S. must prepare both passive and active defenses for its digital infrastructure while helping develop international law defining acceptable behavior by state and non-state actors in this ever-expanding cyberspace commons. The U.S.
military must be prepared to conduct counter strikes in cyberspace in order to maintain its military advantage and protect the interests of the nation and its allies and partners.
Leaders in both the Department of Homeland Security and the DoD are beginning to make strides toward defining cyberspace and their respective roles and missions in this complex, ever-changing environment. Lastly, but perhaps most importantly, the U.S.
and the international community must accept that the incredible access to information and capabilities the global digital infrastructure provides are going to increase making average citizens more aware of and more a part of conflict than ever. People have always waged wars whether over resources or pride and it is in determining how to best harness this energy in cyberspace that the U.S. will maintain its role as a superpower into the 21 st Century. 
